

Subject: VSTF report comments

From: joehall

To: "voting.systems.task.force@sfgov.org", "ping@zesty.ca"

Date: 03/02/2011 11:05 PM

Apologies this is tardy with respect to the 5p deadline, I was on a plane at the time.  
best, Joe

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See file attached to this message for markup details...

File: VSTFDraftRpt.pdf

Annotation summary:

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a "recount" is a specific legal process governed by a specific part of CA law... I would say "retabulated" or "manually counted"

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